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Article 5

Nichol: Citizens United and the Roberts Court's War on Democracy

CITIZENS UNITED AND THE ROBERTS COURT’S
WAR ON DEMOCRACY
Gene Nichol *
There has been much hysteria expressed about the Roberts Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. 1 The
American Constitution Society called it “the most aggressive
intervention into politics by the Supreme Court in the modern era.” 2
The Washington Post declared that the ruling “shakes the foundation
of corporate limitations on federal state elections that stretch back a
century.” 3 Jonathan Turley said the decision “will bring on a tsunami
of sewer money.” 4 Fred Wertheimer concluded that the justices “had
no idea what they were unleashing.” 5 Senator Russ Feingold charged
that the members of the majority “completely disregarded their
oaths” of office. 6 Ronald Dworkin tagged Citizens United as “the
decision that threatens democracy.” 7 Richard Hasen pronounced
January 21, 2010 “a bad day for America.” 8 Even our cerebral, too
dispassionate President claimed “the Supreme Court reversed a
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special
* Professor of Law and Director, Center on Poverty Work & Opportunity, University of North
Carolina.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. See MONICA YOUN, CITIZENS UNITED: THE AFTERMATH, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (June
2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Youn%20Citizens
%20United.pdf.
3. Robert Barnes & Dan Eggen, Court Rejects Corporate Political Spending Limits, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
4. Jonathan Turley, Citizens United Ruling Brings on “Tsunami of Sewer Money,” Nov. 3, 2010,
http://jonathanturley.org/2010/11/03/citizens-united-ruling-brings-on-tsunami-of-sewer-money.html.
5. Fred Wertheimer, POLITICO Op-ed by Democracy 21 President Fred Wertheimer: Court’s
corruption of election law, DEMOCRACY 21, Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.democracy21.org/
index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BAC81D4FF-0476-4E28-B9B17619D271A334%7D&DE=%7BD
2BF405D-127F-4DCC-B9AD-C95CC2012B46%7D.
6. Robert Barnes, In Wis., Feingold Feels Impact of Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2010, at
A8,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/31/
AR2010103104314.html.
7. Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 13, 2010,
at 63–67.
8. See Richard Hasen, Citizens United: What Happens Next?, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Richard_Hasen_1FE691B8-7BF2-481C-B3BCBB4072BC1703.html.
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interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in
our elections.” 9 This apparently goaded Justice Samuel Alito to
mouth the words “not true” at the State of the Union address as if he
were a mere congressman from South Carolina. 10
It is my assignment, as I understand it, to contribute to, and expand
upon, this unsophisticated hysteria. I am honored to do so. We all
have our parts to play. Especially since, unlike most of today’s
panelists, I’m not really an election law expert. I have, however,
worked on an array of these issues as an activist for a good while.
And I’ve surely had more experience losing elections than anyone
else you’re likely to hear from during these deliberations.
I. PROCESS
I begin by saying there are a few things about the Citizens United
case that make me cranky. The first, I’m confident, we can agree
about. On behalf of law students, professors, and all others not paid
by the hour, I am sick of 175, 200, and 250 page opinions. I like
Justice Stevens well enough, but an 88-page dissent is absurd, and
cruel. I don’t care if he did apologize for it. 11
And speaking of cruelty, especially at a law review conference, in
the majority opinion, to bolster his claims, Justice Kennedy wrote:
“Bellotti’s dictum is thus supported only by a law review student
comment, which misinterpreted Buckley.” 12 Then he cites the
unfortunate University of Pennsylvania student comment. Imagine
being singled out explicitly in a Supreme Court opinion, explaining
how lousy your student work product is. Good lord.

9. President Barack Obama, Weekly Address (Jan. 23, 2010) (transcript available at
www.whitehouse.gov).
10. Martin Kady, Justice Alito mouths ‘not true,’ POLITICO, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/politicolive/0110/Justice_Alitos_You_lie_moment.html.
11. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 931 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the
Court’s opinion require a full response.”)).
12. Id. at 909 (majority opinion) (citing Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity:
Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 386, 408 (1977)).
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Second, on the cranky front, save us from these passive, modest
jurists—judges who “just call balls and strikes.” 13 Plenty has been
said about this grotesque hypocrisy, in this meeting and elsewhere.
So I won’t go on about it here. My favorite fusillade, thus far, though,
is Senator Arlen Specter’s claim in his farewell address that Chief
Justice “Roberts promised to just call the balls and strikes and then
moved the bases.” 14 But reaching so hard, overruling so much,
dusting off so much, bringing up matters on their own, scheduling reargument, effectively filing their own action—these are hardly the
hallmarks of temperate and restrained justices. Then, remarkably,
Justice Kennedy began the opinion explaining that “we are asked to
reconsider Austin, and, in effect, McConnell.” 15 I suppose he was
reluctant to say, “we’ve asked” ourselves. Justice Scalia got it right
two years ago when he chided that this “faux judicial restraint is
judicial obfuscation.” 16
I don’t mind all this too much myself. There are, in fact, no nonactivists on our high court. But I do wish we could take the
“deferential, minimalist, strict constructionist, referee, balls and
strikes” jargon out of our judicial-political repertoire. It is nauseating,
if nothing else.
Third, speaking of Justice Scalia, God save us from the “occasional
originalist.” 17 No vision of the original meaning of the First
Amendment could support this decision unless it’s rooted in such a
lofty and controverted level of generalization that it loses all its
cabining possibility. And constraint, of course, is the basis for
originalism’s power. 18 We now require not only a theory of
13. This is the role Chief Justice Roberts declared for himself, famously, in his confirmation
hearings. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John
Roberts, nominee, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court).
14. Jennifer Rubin, Did the No Labels Folks Read Arlen Specter’s Speech?, WASH. POST (POST
OPINIONS), Dec. 23, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/rightturn/2010/12/did_the_no_labels_
folks_read_a.html.
15. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
16. See Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (Scalia J.,
concurring).
17. See Gene Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70
U. Colo. L. Rev. 953 (1999).
18. Id.
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originalism, but a theory that explains—in the affirmative action
cases, 19 the voting rights cases, 20 the Tenth Amendment cases, 21 and
the corporate speech cases—when one is, apparently, supposed to
reject the theory he otherwise espouses.
Fourth, and more real. These objections are mere matters of
etiquette. No one who reads actually thinks John Roberts is an
incrementalist or Antonin Scalia an originalist. Campaign finance law
is lousy. 22 The Congress and especially the Supreme Court, by
constantly leaving only half of various regulatory programs standing,
have made it inconsistent, infuriating, and incomprehensible. 23 I
don’t deny that. It is chocked full of distinctions without a difference
and loopholes that are, well, loopy. Still, Citizens United marched up
the hill to declare—enthusiastically, unnecessarily, and probably
unalterably—that corporations are free to spend unlimited amounts of
money from their astonishingly ample treasuries in federal, state, and
local elections to support or defeat candidates. 24

19. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
20. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
21. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
22. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign
Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985).
23. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating much of massive campaign finance law
and setting up unpersuasive distinctions between contributions and independent expenditures, gift limits
and expenditure caps, etc.); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (candidate races
versus ballot measures); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’ P.A.C., 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (similar); McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (similar); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating millionaire’s
amendment).
24.
Those choices and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make. ‘The First
Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought
and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression
of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people and the Government may not
prescribe the means used to conduct it.’
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003)).
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II. IMPACT
There are many things that can be said about that. The one I can’t
get past is this. Let’s say that North Carolina Senator Kay Hagan is
trying, as she was a few months ago, to decide whether to support a
bill taxing these obscene, hand-out driven, bank bonuses. Assume,
for purposes of discussion, that she is troubled by the notion that
bonuses for millionaires and billionaires, who wrecked the economy,
are wrung from the modest wages of waitresses and coal miners.
After Citizens United, Bank of America’s lobbyist can come into her
office and say, I would suppose, directly or indirectly, vaguely or
bluntly, privately or publicly: “If you’re our friend in this, if you’re
supportive of banking freedom and the marvels of free financial
markets, we’re prepared to spend a couple million in ads on your
behalf next year. If you’re against us, we’re inclined to spend a
couple of million to take you out. Here’s to Thomas Jefferson and the
First Amendment.” 25
Perhaps it will be necessary to be somewhat veiled about it.
Though, I don’t think so. As the New York Times has reported, the
nation’s most prestigious and lucrative lobbying firm lawyers
indicate that they are, unsurprisingly, informing their clients that
“lobbyists can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my
company . . . will spend unlimited sums advertising explicitly against
your re-election.” 26

25. I readily concede, of course, that the “independent” expenditure bullying that Citizens United
opens up for corporate and union treasuries could, already, likely occur at the hands of wealthy
individuals, and perhaps various political action committees or 527s. See Davis v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating millionaire’s amendment). In my judgment, this too is
wrong, and at odds with a sensible interpretation of the ground rules of an egalitarian democracy. But
the volume of such expenditures—given the size of corporate treasuries—embraced by Citizen United
will literally swamp any system of campaign finance regulation. I have little doubt that is the ruling’s
purpose.
26. David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbies’ New Power: Cross Us, And Our Cash Will Bury You, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010 at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 1385477 (“The Supreme Court has handed
lobbyists a new weapon. A lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company,
labor union or interest group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your reelection . . . . ‘We have got a million we can spend advertising for you or against you—whichever one
you want,’ a lobbyist can tell lawmakers, said Lawrence M. Noble, a lawyer at Skadden Arps in
Washington and former general counsel of the Federal Election Commission.”).
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Or, in the alternative, lobbyists might now simply re-trace the
pattern described by Judge Michaels of the Fourth Circuit in his
opinion in Right to Life v. Leeke. 27 There, representatives of
commercial hog farmers filmed threatening advertisements and
brought them in for individualized screenings with the congressmen.
They learned, then, that it was unnecessary to actually purchase and
run the spots. The battle was won without the necessity of firing the
shot. And what is now true for presidential and congressional
elections, is, of course, true across the land, at all levels of
government, and in all branches of government, including judicial
elections. It is fascinating, as others have noted, 28 and comical to
compare Caperton v. Massey Coal 29 with Citizens United.
A few months ago in North Carolina we celebrated the fiftieth
anniversary of the sit-in movements launched in Greensboro. After
the courageous demonstrations had been underway for a couple
weeks, Dr. Martin Luther King came to town to support the students.
He said, pointedly, that these four young men had shown that the
brutal practices of segregation and the high promises of the
Constitution couldn’t be squared. 30 He then added, in a statement I’ve
long loved, “[A]nd all the dialectics of all the logicians in the world
can’t make them lie down together.” 31
The Citizens United ruling is not as important as integration. I’m
not saying that. But the notion that “if you don’t come my way, I’m
dropping a couple million to take you out”—which is now lionized,
sanctified, beautified, beatified, and deemed essential core sacred
political discourse—is a reality that cannot “be made to lie down”
with the concept of egalitarian democracy. And all the wrangling and
linguistics and hermeneutics and metaphysics of “all the”
constitutional theorists “in the world” can’t make it otherwise. And I
think we know it. It’s like Lyndon Johnson once said, “We may not
27. N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 535 F.3d 274, 335–36 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting).
28. Youn, supra note 3.
29. Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (large independent expenditure in judicial
election creates sufficient appearance of corruption to require recusal as matter of due process).
30. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63, at 244–277
(1988).
31. Id. at 275.
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know much, but we know the difference between chicken shit and
chicken salad.” 32
III. MAKING REGULATION USELESS
Citizens United renders all campaign finance limitations silly and
ridiculous. That may be the purpose, of course. I have worked for
decades to foster various caps on campaign contributions. But even I
think it is absurd to say that an individual should be limited to giving
one or two or three or four thousand dollars when a corporation,
across the county or across the country, can spend millions to affect
the outcome of an election. If Buckley v. Valeo 33 has created an
unsatisfactory set of distinctions and compromises to undergird and
shadow the regulation of money in American politics, Citizens United
shoves the wobbling structure over the cliff. What’s left in its place,
of course, is an inviolate right to use wealth to dominate the operation
of the political process.
Citizens United won’t fix the tedium and inconsistency of
campaign finance law. It just swamps it in a corporate tide. We will
still be in the business of drawing absurd lines. A lot of state
legislatures, like my own, are not happy with the decision. So they
will now pass corporate governance laws to try to get at the problem.
Perhaps shareholders will be required to bestow permission for such
political expenditures. Maybe statutes will even require stockholder
super-majorities. The five Justices constituting the Citizens United
majority will, no doubt, rebel at this. No one wants to let his
landmark ruling be sidestepped by mere fancy corporate-governance
footwork. So we will, soon, constitutionalize various principles of
corporate organization. And we will do that, rather obviously, out of
whole cloth. Such are the wages of recognizing the inherent, natural
rights of artificial, state-created entities. Wait and see.

32. See Intelligence Quotes, http://www.amusingquotes.com/h/i/Intelligence_1.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2011).
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Nor will even the political supporters of Citizens United ultimately
be thrilled, I’m guessing, when the corporate subsidiaries of various
foreign governments are unleashed into the American electoral
process. Relatively few of our leaders would take delight in the
prospect of the Chinese or Saudi Arabian governments debating, in
each cycle, how much money to invest in our elections. So, I assume,
eventually, we’ll get laws against that and then constitutional
constraints on those laws—even though they’ll be inconsistent with
the theory of Citizens United. 34 But we’ll develop rules about foreign
ownership; how much foreign ownership, how much stock? I support
the “one shareholder” rule myself—if a corporation has even a single
foreign shareholder, it would be barred from exercising the rights
declared in Citizens United. Again, the Court would likely invalidate
such a move, but I’m not sure, analytically, how one distinguishes
between one percent and seventy-five, or fifty, or thirty. Whatever
rules unfold, they will be endless and arbitrary and unrooted in the
American Constitution.
The core of Citizens United is premised on an assumption that no
one, literally no one, involved in politics believes to be true. Justice
Kennedy’s lynchpin is the following: the “absence of prearrangement
and coordination of expenditures”—the formal independence from a
campaign—“defeats concerns for corruption or the appearance of
corruption, and eliminates the risk of improper influence on or
commitments by candidates.” 35 Interesting, I suppose. But no one
who has been within one hundred yards of an electoral campaign
believes it.
Now we shall have the disclosure battles as well. The 2010 offyear congressional races were deluged with massive, secretive,
purportedly independent, expenditures. The election was, all told, the
most costly and least transparent midterm in our history. 36 In it, we
witnessed embarrassing claims by the Chamber of Commerce and
34. Citizens United purports to reject distinctions in speech regulation based on the identity of the
speaker. The notion would not seem to be geographically bound.
35. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010).
36. Gene Nichol, Campaign Reforms, Supremely Trashed, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 13,
2010, at A8, available at 2010 WLNR 24649360.
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various other corporate millionaires about the essential requirement
of anonymity in the funding of electoral expenditures. 37 The need to
throw one’s financial weight around without being held accountable
by customers or shareholders was equated, shamefully, with the
threat of terror directed against NAACP members in civil rights era
Alabama. 38 I guess there is not much people won’t say.
I don’t think of myself as a campaign finance scholar. But, as I’ve
said, I have worked on this issue, in one way or another, for many
years. Like Yogi Berra, I’m also not much of a prognosticator.
Especially about the future. But I do remember thinking, and arguing,
over two decades ago, against spirited claims for the total
deregulation of campaign finance. The best system, the theory then
went, rejects all limits on contributions and expenditures, in favor of
quick and complete disclosure. I remember arguing, in response, that
the moment powerful corporate economic forces achieve
deregulation, we will begin to hear claims that disclosure, too, must
be barred. Big spenders, the assertion goes, should not be made to
risk their profits while funding the political opponents of their
customers. Not even the market should get in the way of rich folks
purchasing politics. For once, it seems, I was right.

37. Eric Lipton et. al., Top Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce Campaign, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/us/politics/22chamber.html?
scp2&sq=chamber%20election&st=cse.
38. Theodore Olson, winning counsel in Citizens United, spoke critically of the Democracy is
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 4795, 111th Cong.
(2010), arguing, “Though it comes wrapped up in language of ‘transparency’, the plain intent of the
Schumer and Van Hollen legislation—the purpose invoked by its sponsors—is to discourage people
from exercising their right to free speech.” Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber:
Schumer & Van Hollen Bills are Brazen Attempt to Silence Free Speech on Eve of Elections (Apr. 29,
2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/april/us-chamber-schumer-vanhollen-bills-are-brazen-attempt-silence-free-speech (quoting Theodore Olson, Counsel for Citizens
United)). Olson compared the right of corporations to “speak” with the right to be free from harassment
articulated in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Brennan Center,
Campaign Finance Disclosure, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/disclosure.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
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IV. WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY
What increasingly emerges from the Roberts Court’s campaign
finance decisions, like a mountain appearing through the receding
mists, is a foundational conclusion that the United States
Constitution, ultimately, secures a power for people of wealth to use
their disproportionate economic resources to get their way in our
politics. It is unsurprising, therefore, than even public funding
programs are now decidedly within the Court’s sights. The upcoming
McComish case 39 will likely invalidate funding plans that employ
“rescue” funds—triggered when opponents massively outspend
participating publicly-financed candidates. This will, no doubt, render
many public funding plans unattractive to competitive candidates.
Who wants to unilaterally disarm with no corresponding means of
reply? But I doubt that this half-step will prove sufficient, in the
longer course, for the Citizens United majority. After all, if the
natural order of things calls for the wealthy to have a disproportionate
share of political power, any public financing move disturbs the
claims of inherent worth and justice.
As one contemplates the Supreme Court’s moves to augment the
protection of economic influence in our democratic decision-making,
it is helpful, if jarring, to note Larry Bartels’ highly-regarded study,
published two years ago, entitled “Unequal Democracy: The Political
Economy of the New Gilded Age.” 40 In it, Bartels demonstrated, by
an extensive exploration of floor votes, polling data, constituent
preferences, economic status, campaign contributions and the like—
for a six year period in the United States Senate—that the “views of
poor people had no direct effect on the behavior of either Democrats
or Republicans after they were elected.” 41 Senators showed an “utter
lack of responsiveness to the views of millions of people whose only
39. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Weigh Constitutionality of Arizona Public Campaign
Finance Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2010, at A2, available at 2010 WLNR 25816267; see also Richard
M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 283
(2010).
40. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE (2008).
41. Id. at 280–82 (emphasis omitted).
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distinguishing characteristic is their low income.” 42 Economic
inequality, Bartels claimed, “has pervasive, corrosive effects on
political representation and policy-making in contemporary
America.” 43 In Aristotelian terms, he concluded, we operate as
oligarchy, not democracy. The “opinions of . . . ordinary citizens in
the bottom third of the income distribution have no discernible
impact on the behavior of their elected officials.” 44
Bartels study mirrored another, broader, report published by
Martin Gilens, in 2005. It concluded that “the well-off are vastly
more likely to see their views reflected in subsequent policy changes”
than their economic inferiors. Influence over “actual policy outcomes
appears to be reserved almost exclusively to those at the top of the
income distribution.” 45
Citizen United, Davis, 46 Wisconsin Right to Life, 47 and, I fear,
McComish 48—these decisions say, at bottom, that there is something
about our Constitution that means we are flatly powerless to deal
with the scourge of purchased politics. This cannot be so. It is
dangerous and demeaning to the world’s strongest democracy to
suggest that it is.

42. Id. at 285.
43. Id. at 284.
44. Id.
45. Bartels, supra note 41, at 286 (“[R]epresentational biases of this magnitude call into question the
very democratic character of our society.” (quoting Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic
Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 778–96 (2005)).
46. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). .
47. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
48. McComish presents a challenge to Arizona’s public campaign financing program. It is being
argued before the Supreme Court in March 2011. The consolidated cases are Ariz. Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett (No. 10-238) and McComish v. Bennett (No. 10-239).
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